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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the role of irony and satire in public discourse on Brexit. It is argued that 
pro-Brexit discourse is structurally and textually ironic, that this irony has a significant 
relationship with taboo and transgression, and that this has implications for the analysis of 
Brexit. Building on this, the article shows that an analysis of Brexit discourse must take account 
of Brexit irony and that this task is specifically aided by insight from critical humour studies. 
Alongside this, the article argues that some comedians, through some uses of satire, are 
uniquely able to criticise Brexit discourse in ways that are not open to ‘serious’ political 
commentators. The article uses political discourse from Nigel Farage and Michael Gove, and 
comedy from Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, to highlight these points.  
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Introduction 
In a recent documentary for Channel 4, Grayson Perry attempted to capture the identity of 
European Union (EU) leave and remain supporters. Early in the show, Perry talked with leave 
supporters in Boston, the area of the UK with the highest leave vote by percentage. A 
participant named Yvonne explained her reasons for wanting to leave the EU:  
 




In a way, I just feel that England can stand on its own two feet. British Isles, we’ve got a 
lot to offer. We stood on our own two feet years ago, when we had the Second World War 
and I feel that um, we will go forward in great numbers […]. There was a volume of them 
came all at once. They didn’t just trickle in, they came all at once. And I think that’s what 
shocked the whole of the town and the area, was this influx of varying nationalities. And 
they felt that the town was being taken off them (Perry 2017).  
 
Yvonne’s comments encompass a number of the themes of leave discourse - an ambiguous mix 
of English and British nationalism, culturalism and cultural protectionism, localism, post-
colonial anxiety and/or nostalgia, anti-globalism, and a denial or rejection of interconnectivity 
and interdependence, both past and present. What is also present is a ‘reconstructed’ anti-
immigrant sentiment that is not simply xenophobic. Yvonne demonstrates that it is quite 
literally a description that relies on liquidity or ambiguity to paint a picture of mass migration 
as problematic. Perry comments on the irony of the leave camp in Boston, where this sentiment 
is expressed concurrent with farming in the area that relies heavily on migrant labour for its 
very existence. This article focuses on irony further as a key analytic concept for critiquing 
Brexit discourse1. 
     Perry’s example highlights one of the ‘situational ironies’ of Brexit, where a widely 
accepted binary discourse on the effect of EU migration appears incongruous, incoherent or 
partial in relation to aspects of the situation being described (for example, in Yvonne’s 
description, migrants play no role in revitalising Boston). It is shown throughout the article that 
                                                             
1 Henceforth, ‘pro-Brexit discourse’ will be referred to as ‘Brexit discourse’. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to detail ironies in Remain discourse and they are not discussed. Pro-Brexit discourse is a broad concept that 
encompasses a number of forms of argumentation that are pro-Brexit. Moore and Ramsay (2017: 5) identify six 
key themes in analysis of media coverage of the EU referendum that can be used as a guide. They are ‘the 
economy, immigration, sovereignty, dishonesty, fear, and the ‘Establishment’’ (2017: 5).   
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there are also ‘textual’ or ‘postmodern’ ironies in Brexit discourse that work to hide broader 
situational ironies. Specifically, public and political discourse on Brexit contains irony that 
works to express taboo and transgression in relation to racialization, racism and xenophobia.2 
The ironic or ambiguous component of much Brexit discourse functions to describe the 
unknown as positive and to circumvent connections with often taboo discourses of racism and 
xenophobia. These connections seem very easy to identify yet are befuddled by the irony. The 
irony of Brexit is examined through the mythic figure of the trickster. As a discursive strategy, 
trickster tactics are significant in Brexit discourse as a method for constructing ironic 
transgression that has populist appeal, and for constructing ‘new’ discursive taboos aimed at 
quieting remain supporters. Such discursive strategies appear postmodern in style (Lyotard, 
1994: xxiii).  
     Because of the constitutive irony of Brexit discourse, some uses of satire are uniquely able 
to criticise Brexit discourse in a manner not available to serious political commentators. Comic 
and satiric responses to Brexit are predominantly from comedians that supported the remain 
campaign or who are heavily critical of Brexit politicians and supporters. Using rhetorical 
discourse analysis (see Weaver [2015] for a full outline of this methodology), and drawing on 
a purposive sample from John Oliver’s US comedy show Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, 
the satiric devices used to unpack Brexit irony are highlighted. Brexit has been mentioned five 
times on Last Week Tonight with John Oliver. An exemplar with regard to the satiric unpacking 
of irony. the comedy highlights Brexit tropes and appeals to realism, performing in a more 
modernist style that attempts to ‘speak truth to power’ and assert the rational.  
                                                             
2 ‘Taboo’ is defined simply as the breaking of social custom. Taboo discourse is the language of taboo – that 
which presents positions that are generally considered to be taboo. In relation to racialisation, racism and 
xenophobia, Brexit discourse offers a reconfiguration of ‘acceptable’ discourse. ‘Transgression’ is defined here 
as discursive boundary crossing – the social processes, or discursive events, by which taboos are shifted. 
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     Although there is documented evidence of racialisation and racism affecting Eastern 
European migrants before the EU referendum of 23rd June 2016 (Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 
2012: 680), there was a post-referendum spike in reports of hate crime directed at all ethnic 
minority groups (Fox 2017). Adam Lusher (2016) in The Independent reports on a number of 
racist and fascistic expressions that followed the EU referendum, which included 
“[c]omparisons with 1930s Nazi Germany and a crowd striding through a London street 
chanting: ‘First we’ll get the Poles out, then the gays!’” (Lusher 201). I argue that examples of 
race hate that follow the EU referendum are rendered permissible by a discourse on Brexit and 
racism that contains an amount of liquidity, that befuddles critique and attempts ‘acceptability’ 
(Bauman 2000: 168; Weaver 2011: 64-64). Brexit discourse is ambiguous, unstable, taboo and 
not taboo, contains polarisations, yet articulates older themes from cultural racism and anti-
immigrant prejudice (Weaver 2011: 97-117).  
 
     The aims of the article are addressed first through a discussion of the context of Brexit as 
one framed by populism and globalisation, before elaborating on the analytic usefulness of the 
concepts of tricksters and taboo for understanding Brexit discourse. Then I examine two 
examples of Leave campaigning, one from Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Michael 
Gove, and one from United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) Nigel Farage, highlighting the irony in both, before detailing the satiric 
response from John Oliver.   
 
Populism, Globalisation and Brexit 
Brexit has been regularly referred to as a populism (Thompson 2016). Brexit discourse matches 
several of the components of populism outlined by Taggart (2000: 2-3). These are: 1) 
“ambivalence about politics, especially representative politics. Politics […] [as] messy and 
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corrupting” (ibid.: 3); 2) identifying “with an idealized version of its chosen people, and […] a 
similarly idealized landscape” (ibid.); 3) “an ideology lacking core values” (ibid.: 2); 4) “a 
powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis” (ibid.); and 5) “containing fundamental 
dilemmas that make it self-limiting” (ibid.). These tendencies appear to varying degrees in 
Brexit discourse and some will be addressed in more detail in this paper. Point 2, on an 
idealized people and landscape, is best addressed through a discussion of globalisation and 
Brexit. 
     Responses to globalisation feature heavily in this populism, where there is a polarisation of 
debate on globalisation, and discussion of the haves and the have-nots of the global world, of 
who does and does not benefit. The character of discussion fits the dichotomy of a 
“utopia/dystopia of globalisation” (Featherstone 2013: 67, original emphasis) that is prominent 
in Zygmunt Bauman’s Liquid Modernity (Bauman 2000: 1). In Bauman’s description, there 
are those who gain – the tourist, and the rich inside the gated community, and those that suffer 
– the ‘other’, the poor, the migrant. The populist discourse that surrounds Brexit focuses on 
two of these tropes – the ‘other’ as migrant and ‘us’ as the poor, or the becoming poor – and 
sees the construction of the migrant as scapegoat for the latter concepts. The breaking and 
reconstruction of taboo discourse on the ‘other’ is fundamental argumentation in this process. 
Featherstone describes the process of globalisation as one that is reaching saturation point: 
“There is nowhere for this process to go, but to turn back in on itself” (Featherstone 2013: 71). 
This signals a point of crisis for globalisation that is analogous to the Brexit sentiment. The 
leave vote was in many ways a call for contraction, yet this is a self-limiting component of its 
populism because the discourse also contains the call for Britain to look globally in moving 
away from Europe.  
     Articulations of social class have been used to describe the populism of the Brexit vote as 
positive. Brendan O’Neill did so in The Spectator on 2nd July 2016: 
 




Brexit voters are not thick, not racist: just poor  
By forcing Britain to quit the EU they have given a bloody nose to an elite that views them 
with contempt. 
This rebellion wasn’t caused by racism or a paroxysm of infantile anger. It was considered. 
The workers spied an opportunity to take the elite that despises them down a peg or two – 
and they seized it. They asserted their power, and in the process, blimey: they changed the 
world. (O’Neill 2016, original bold) 
 
O’Neill’s commentary points to a predominately working class nationalism as something that 
has been stigmatized and repressed, especially by the political Left, where there have been 
relative successes for anti-racism, with anti-immigrant sentiment increasingly taboo. Such 
nationalism is sceptical of multiculturalism and European free movement. That said, the Brexit 
vote as a populist expression driven by working class anger, particularly working class northern 
anger, has been described as a partial analysis by Dorling: 
  
Contrary to popular belief, 52% of people who voted Leave in the EU referendum lived in 
the southern half of England, and 59% were in the middle classes, while the proportion of 
Leave voters in the lowest two social classes was just 24% […]. Most people younger than 
50 who voted, voted to remain. But rather than blame the older generation, their ire should 
instead be directed squarely at all the post 1979 UK governments that have allowed 
economic inequalities to rise so high. (Dorling 2016)  
 
The middle classes of over fifty years of age are consistently more likely to vote than younger 
voters and were significant in the Brexit decision. The inclusion of a middle class vote 
highlights the expansive populist appeal of the discourse. Despite the seemingly broad class 
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construction of the Brexit decision, and the appeal of Brexit to those of all classes, in some 
instances this appeal translates directly into an argument over the nature of taboo and the 
boundaries of discourse in relation to the ‘other’ that are mediated through but not reducible to 
generational experience and class position – dichotomies that have significantly affected 
comedy taste. It is therefore reasonable to assume that positions on Brexit are expressed very 
well through comedy.  
 
Tricksters, Taboo and the EU Referendum 
The trickster is a figure from myth, documented in anthropology, and a trope that directly 
relates to the crossing of social and/or discursive boundaries, and creative activity (Turner, 
1987: 168-169). There are instances where such figures connect with comedy although they 
are not inherently comic figures. They are more accurately described as brokers of change or 
ambiguity. The trickster will be used as an analytic tool to explain some pro-Brexit discourse, 
particularly the use of irony as a trope in political discourse, which is employed to reshape 
consensus and taboo, assert populist themes, and attack perceived inertia.  
     The trickster is a figure that often accompanies changing social realities and the ambiguity 
of periods of social change. The idea of liminality is used by Victor Turner (1974: 58, 1982: 
32-33, 1987: 107), who draws on van Gennep’s conceptualisation of rites of passage, to 
describe the unstable part of change processes where taboos can be altered or erased and new 
norms created. This, for Turner, is described as “anti-structure” (ibid.). This is an apposite 
nomenclature for the UK’s EU referendum and Brexit period. Turner describes the liminal as 
a period where “subjects pass through a period of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo which has 
few […] of the attributes of either the preceding or subsequent profane […] cultural states” 
(Turner 1974: 57). The liminoid is added by Turner (1974: 58) as a revised concept for modern 
society and one that moves away from the structural functionalism of the earlier idea of 
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liminality, towards an inclusion of individuality (cf. ibid.: 83). Although trickster activity is 
concerned with social change in liminoid or ambiguous social space, it is important to note that 
the direction of changes that can occur through trickster activity can be both conservative 
and/or revolutionary. They are thus perfectly suited for populist agitation. Elements of the leave 
campaign and surrounding Brexit discourse take on the characteristics of trickster discourse 
and appear postmodern. 
     The trickster is described as a character that interrupts social order through the creation of 
disruption or chaos that then creates the possibility for new social realities (cf. Hyde 2008: 1; 
Mackin 2002: 191; Vizenor 1988: x). Mackin (2002) describes tricksters “as outlaws who 
manipulate meta-level fantasies and who are then in a position to realign the social world” 
(ibid.: 201). In the populism of Brexit, fantasies of the nation and control are engaged to create 
new political realities. The Brexit trickster is one that emerges under the conditions of free 
movement in the EU but seeks to reassert the boundary. Although Hyde claims that the trickster 
as traveller is “‘on the road’ […] the lord of in-between […] he is the spirit of the road at dusk, 
the one that runs from one town to another and belongs to neither” (2008: 6), the Brexit trickster 
is one that wishes to halt this movement, control the road, and place the furtive trickster on the 
other side of the border.  
 
Brexit Politics and Satire: Data Analysis 
This section analyses two instances of leave campaigning and two comedic responses to it. The 
sample is strictly purposive and thus no claim of representativeness is made here. The selection 
of political campaigning is made on the basis of the two examples being ironic, taboo 
transgression. The comic responses are exemplars of political satire designed to unpack such 
irony. The first instance of campaigning is from the Conservative Member of Parliament and 
leave campaigner, Michael Gove. This is responded to by the comedian John Oliver, on his US 
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Home Box Office show Last Week Tonight with John Oliver. The second example of leave 
campaigning is from Nigel Farage, the then leader of UKIP and a key figure in the ‘leave.EU’ 
campaign. Again, the comedic response is from John Oliver on Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver. 
Michael Gove and the Irony of Post-Expertise 
In a Sky News interview on 3rd June 2016, Michael Gove was questioned by the Sky journalist 
Faisal Islam on the broad range of expert and organisational disagreement with Gove’s 
economic position on the benefits of leaving the EU. Gove employs in the interview an anti-
elitist, populist discourse. He positions himself as representing ‘the people’ with organisations 
and experts against Brexit, and indeed Faisal Islam himself, as representation of the elites. He 
urges the British people to “take back control of our destiny from those organisations that are 
distant, unaccountable and elitist” (Gove and Islam 2016. Emphasis added). Gove continues: 
   
Michael Gove: I think the people in this country have had enough, of experts, with uh 
organisations… 
Faisal Islam: Had enough of experts? 
M.G.: from acronyms, saying, saying… 
F.I.: People in this country have had enough of experts? What do you mean by that? 
M.G.: from organisations with acronyms, saying they know what is best and getting it 
consistently wrong. (Gove and Islam 2016) 
 
Gove’s discourse relies on a rhetoric of populism, of the people verses, importantly, elitist 
experts. To return to Taggart’s definition of populism, we see the discourse contains 
“ambivalence about politics […] [as] corrupting” (Taggart 2000: 3), “an idealized version of 
its chosen people” (ibid.), “a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis” (ibid.: 2), and less 
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explicitly “fundamental dilemmas that make it self-limiting” (ibid.). The final point will be 
expanded shortly. The rhetorical device of argumentum ad hominem is obvious because it is 
the dubious character of the experts that is attacked, their distance and unaccountability, rather 
than the content of their argument. The argument follows that they are wrong because of their 
privileged social position and because they benefit from the EU, rather than because of any 
counterargument offered by Gove or the leave campaign. Where evidence is employed by Gove 
in the interview, it relies on the trope of anecdote, with a brief story about his father’s business 
that is analogised to explain economic problems across the country. The discourse expressed 
matches Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (1979), which specifies the end 
of credulity for grand narratives in postmodernity and the proliferation of language games of 
competing truth claims. The experts of globalisation are increasingly called into question. The 
upset of any certainty of ideas and the proposed validation of populist interpretations of reality 
fit well with the zeitgeist of contemporary politics, where ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ 
act to establish the ‘truth’ of the ‘theft’ enacted by the elites.  
     But none of this can be read literally. Gove is employing irony in the interview, which is 
another postmodern theme (cf. Flieger 1991: 21). Sometimes the irony of postmodernity is 
described as playful but it can also be described as coupled with the emergence of social 
ambiguity, incongruity or dichotomy. It allows for trickster tactics in ambiguous social spaces. 
Bennett (2016) outlines a concept of blank irony that assists with the analysis of Gove’s 
discourse. Bennett says that “[t]he irony matters… because of what (if we take it literally) it 
is about” (ibid.: 261, original emphasis). It is unlikely that Gove is asserting that society 
ignores expert opinion per se, or even economists in particular, nor is it the acronyms of 
organisations that are especially problematic. Indeed, a literal reading and enactment of 
Gove’s comments would have major consequences for the continuation of meaningful social 
life or society in 21st Century Britain. If Gove is suggesting that ‘the people’ have had enough 
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of experts, he surely cannot endorse this literally, which might imply an ignoring of human 
knowledge and a descent into the absurd. Emile Durkheim’s (1997: 111) concept of organic 
solidarity can be evoked here to imagine the literal interpretation of Gove’s rhetoric, and to 
assert quite strongly that nobody, anywhere, has literally had enough of experts. What does 
irony ‘do’ in this example? To apply Bennett, “what is being said is perhaps not meant – we 
cannot be sure” (ibid.), and thus Gove is able to create a populist rhetoric and appeal, 
simultaneously render the literal interpretation of his message absurd if followed (and a naïve 
interpretation – it is, of course, the sentiment that is important), and make the critique of his 
message a symptom of the very (elitist) activity and problem he is describing. Such play with 
ambiguity is certainly tricksteresque. The liminoid space of the referendum campaign 
encourages a populist expression in which accepted realities can be dismissed in an 
ambiguous, ironic discourse that neither appears to meet any criteria of serious evaluation, nor 
in fact is required to do so.  
 
Speaking Truth to Populism 
Michael Gove is responded to by the comedian John Oliver, who offers a pre-referendum 
attempt to convince the British to vote to remain, which was not aired in the UK by Sky 
Television until after the referendum because it was deemed to be politically unbalanced and 
thus could have been judged to be in breach of broadcast laws during election time: 
  
John Oliver: There’s also overwhelming consensus about the damage Britain could do to 
its economy by leaving. Reports by groups like the British Treasury, the Bank of England, 
the IMF, the OECD, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, Oxford Economics, and the Centre for Economic Performance have 
all predicted that leaving would have a negative effect on the British GDP. And the pro-
Brexit camp’s response to that has not been great. 
 




[Plays clip from the Gove/Islam interview that is reproduced above] 
 
John Oliver: Yes, fuck these eggheads with their studies and degrees, I get my economic 
forecasts from Clever Otis, the GDP predicting horse. 
  
[A picture of a horse with large teeth, wearing glasses with a pencil behind its ear, is shown 
in the caption box] (Oliver 2016) 
 
Oliver employs comic tropes in critique of Gove’s irony. This is, importantly, something that 
is not directly available to Islam in the ‘serious’ political interview format. Oliver clearly acts 
satirically. In the first part of the extract, Oliver simply lists that many organisations predict 
that Britain’s gross domestic product (GDP) will suffer on leaving the EU. This employs the 
tropes of catalogue and repetition (Berger 1995: 54-55), which are juxtaposed with Gove’s 
comments to highlight the perceived fallacy of the latter. After the subtle juxtaposition, Oliver 
uses ridicule and absurdity toward Gove through the presentation of ‘Clever Otis, the GDP 
predicting horse’. The ridicule is constructed through the use of an anthropomorphic rhetorical 
device or image – one that gives human, in this case intellectual, characteristics to an animal. 
This serves to align Gove’s economic expertise with the absurd. Through comedy, this is 
achievable in a manner that is not possible in serious political journalism, and thus it is quickly 
able to disconnect Gove’s statement from truth and reassert modern principles of rationality, 
accuracy and truth.  
 
Nigel Farage, UKIP and Liquid Racism 
UKIP are a party that draw heavily on anti-immigrant discourse, yet they do so with an amount 
of ambiguity and impunity. Their discourse is attacked for containing racism but this is 
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constantly denied. In an interview for Channel 4 News on 20th June 2016, Nigel Farage is 
questioned by Krishnan Guru-Murphy on a controversial ‘leave.UK’ campaign poster that 
depicts a crowd of Syrian refugees:  
 
Krishnan Guru-Murphy: Your poster has been taken by many people to be deeply 
offensive, upsetting, racist, anti-Muslim. Would you like to apologise to them tonight?  
 
Nigel Farage: Well, I issued a very similar poster to that two months before, uh, with very 
little debate, uh. The problem with the poster wasn’t the image, after all, it appeared on all 
of our front-page newspapers, and the strapline ‘the EU has failed us all’, you know, what 
I’m saying is that what Mrs Merkel did last year has led to a huge crisis inside the European 
Union. Add that to the Euro crisis and what on earth are we doing there as members of this 
failing union?  
 
K.G.-M.: Okay so no apology… 
 
N.F.: The problem was of course…  
 
K.G.-M.: Okay so do you see? 
 
N.F.: Well, hang on, hang on…  
 
K.G.-M.: No, let me finish the point. Do you see that, why people would regard this as 
xenophobic and racist? I mean, there you are, in front of a poster full of brown faces on the 
move, coming into Europe, with a big banner headline saying ‘breaking point’. The only 
white face has been obscured by text. Many people took that as deeply offensive, and I ask 
you again, do you want to take this opportunity to say sorry?  
 




N.F.: Well, the Schengen Zone is at breaking point. That is undeniable. Uh the picture is 
true, it wasn’t doctored. What I apologise for is the timing. You know, some people have, 
have been given the impression that somehow we issued this poster after the appalling 
murder in the street that took place, we did not.  
(Farage and Guru-Murphy 2016. Emphasis added) 
 
UKIP draw on anti-immigrant discourse that is layered with ambiguity. Ford, Goodwin and 
Cutts (2012) explain how voters are attracted to UKIP from across the middle and working 
classes for a combination of Euroscepticism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. They argue the 
middle classes frame their interest in terms of Euroscepticism whereas working class support 
is framed in relation to xenophobia and Islamophobia (ibid.: 1). Evans and Mellon (2016) argue 
that UKIP have gained votes from the Labour Party due to the latter’s “move to the ‘liberal 
consensus’ on the EU and immigration” (ibid.: 464). This points to UKIP support as 
symptomatic of a dystopic perception of globalisation. Adding to this analysis, my concept of 
liquid racism (cf. Weaver 2011: 63-64) – a racism of ambiguous cultural signs that combine 
older racisms, political and social issues that are not expressions of racism per se, entrenched 
socio-discursive positing, and an overall ambiguity of racist intent and meaning – can be used 
to explain some of the slipperiness of the discourse of Farage, UKIP and much of the leave 
campaign. Liquidity is encouraged by sophisticated forms of coding and the addition of 
ambiguity or semantic layers to a text, leading to the inability to pin down what is really meant. 
This is also an ironic endeavour. But if we look at what the irony is actually about, the sentiment 
remains anti-immigrant. There is an attempt to transgress taboo and redraw boundaries in such 
ironic trickster activity, which asserts anti-immigrant discourse as not taboo. 
     Guru-Murphy attempts to build anti-racist critique with reference to colour racism and to 
the literal. The poster shows only brown faces. It is connected with other ambiguous statements 
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by Farage. Finally, later in the interview, a question is posed on how many people in the poster 
made it to Britain. This appeal to the literal, as critique, fails to some extent because it does not 
fully describe the content of the racism present in the poster – one that obsesses with crowds 
of ‘others’, borders and movement. 
     Farage’s defence of the poster draws on ambiguity and is ironic in tone. The defence is 
slippery or liquid in construction. In the first part of the answer, Farage suggests that it is the 
timing of the poster that was unfortunate. There is an appeal to the temporal (discussed below) 
in distancing the poster from the murder of Jo Cox MP. Farage does not want the poster to be 
seen as in anyway a response to the murder and the comment that it was released ninety minutes 
before is an attempt to generate distraction and ambiguity on the content of the poster, which 
is the focus of questioning. In defending that content, Farage attempts to fix its interpretation 
by saying the ‘the picture is true, it wasn’t doctored’ while simultaneously asserting the 
truthfulness of his interpretation of the photograph. Farage argues over the meaning of the 
poster and thus attempts to convince the audience by suggesting that his “coded iconic 
message” (Barthes 1977: 34) or connotative reading is in fact the “non-coded iconic message” 
(ibid.: 34) or denotive reading. We know that images are polysemic and ideological. There are 
obvious racist connotations in this poster. Farage acts ironically to deny this in trickster 
discourse that aims to redraw the boundaries of taboo. 
 
Satire and Anti-Racist critique  
John Oliver only briefly deals with the poster, describing it thus: 
  
UKIP argue that a Brexit would enable the UK to significantly reduce immigration, 
preventing both EU citizens from taking British jobs and non-EU citizens from sneaking 
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in to commit terror attacks. And they have not been subtle with toxic posters like this 
showing lines of refugees and the headline ‘Breaking Point’. (Oliver 2016) 
 
The satire offered on the poster is not something that draws on comic tropes. However, Oliver 
offers a critique of UKIP and other incidents of racism involving UKIP members and 
candidates. This provides both an introduction and, importantly, a context: 
 
J.O.: And at this point, you may be thinking if leaving is so universally seen as a bad idea, 
who the fuck is in favour of it? Well, let me introduce you to one of the leading groups 
backing a Brexit, the UK Independence Party, also called UKIP. Their leader is Nigel 
Farage […] UKIP is known for its hardline anti-immigration views, and some of its 
members have engaged in outright racism. Just look at Robert Blay, a UKIP candidate for 
parliament who was suspended after a tabloid paper caught him saying this about a rival of 
Sri Lankan decent: 
 
[Plays clip of Blay]  
Michael Blay: His family’s only been here since the seventies. You’re not British enough 
to be in our parliament. 
 
J.O.: Wow there, just hold, not British enough to be in our parliament? He’s talking about 
a British citizen who was born in London and raised in Hampshire. How is that not British 
enough? Must he literally be a monocled Badger named Reginald who lives in a Shepard’s 
Pie. Is that the bar of entry to him? (Oliver 2016) 
 
Omitted by Oliver is that the secret interview recorded by the Daily Mirror includes Blay 
saying he will shoot the rival (Conservative) candidate if elected, and so expresses a violent 
racism. In this extract, an anthropomorphic image and an exaggeration of national stereotype 
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are used to ridicule Blay. Again, this critiques the comments by separating them from the 
rational, and seeks to reassert racism as unacceptable or taboo. The episode gives two other 
examples of UKIP candidates using racism, and a defence of one of them by Farage. Overall, 
the satire that Oliver develops uses a number of comic tropes that include literalness, absurdity, 
repartee, mimicry, repetition and ridicule (Berger 1995: 54-55). It works to significantly 
undermine the UKIP brand, one that is constructed through an ambiguous relationship with 
taboo discourses of racism and xenophobia, by showing UKIP racism and separating it from 
the reasonable. This does not trivialise the seriousness of the racist discourse and serves to 
reinforce the anti-racist critique. 
 
Conclusion 
The article examines the role of irony and satire in public discourse on Brexit. It argues that 
some pro-Brexit discourse is ironic, that this has implications for the analysis of Brexit, and 
that this irony has a relationship with often taboo discourses of anti-immigration, and allows 
for transgression. The analysis of Brexit discourse needs to take account of Brexit irony as the 
discourse attempts to describe an unknown future as positive and to circumvent connections 
with often taboo discourses of racism and xenophobia. The mythic figure of the trickster was 
introduced to aid the analysis of Brexit discourse. As a discursive strategy, trickster tactics are 
highlighted in Brexit discourse as a method of constructing ironic transgression that has 
populist appeal, and of constructing ‘new’ discursive taboos aimed at quieting remain 
supporters. Such discursive strategies are postmodern in style. The irony of pro-Brexit, anti-
immigrant discourse works to transgress what is held by many to be the boundaries of taboo 
discourse. This image of the trickster as a policer of the boundary is both a conservative and 
revolutionary trickster.  
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     Comedians, through some uses of satire, are uniquely able to criticise populist incongruity 
in ways that are not open to ‘serious’ political commentators. Satiric responses to Brexit 
discourse from John Oliver are shown to be able to deconstruct Brexit tropes and appeal to 
realism. This is an appeal to stability, as the comedian performs the role of highlighting 
absurdity. The comedian can be said to attempt performance in an Enlightenment, modernist 
style that ‘speaks truth to power’. In terms of the implications for political communication, 
comic discourse may be able to achieve something that other discourse cannot. By critiquing 
irony as absurd through the use of other comic tropes, rather than seeking to pin down the 
precise meaning or actual message inside populist communication, satire is able to highlight 
the construction of the ironic message as formed through comic incongruity, and thus 
demonstrate its distance from nuanced descriptions of social reality. This highlights the 
continuing importance of political satire for comprehending ambiguous, populist discourse, 
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